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Abstract The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s
memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to
the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial infor-
mation results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research
has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorpora-
tion of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question:
do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that
they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite
its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal)
conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to mem-
ory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate
testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some
implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the mis-
information effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader “information
effect”.
Keywords Memory · Eyewitness memory · Constructive memory · Testimony ·
Epistemic luck · Misinformation effect
The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s memory rep-
resentation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinfor-
mation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results
in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed
primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate
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information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting
memory beliefs qualify as knowledge?
This puzzle has not so far been discussed in the literature1; given the centrality
of episodic memory as an epistemic source, however, its importance should be clear.
It is intuitively plausible that the beliefs in question do not meet the standards for
knowledge, for they appear to be only luckily true. I will argue, however, that, despite
its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal)
conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to mem-
ory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from incorporation of accurate
testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some
implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the mis-
information effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader “information
effect”.
The question with which I am concerned here should be distinguished from the
question, discussed by Martin and Deutscher (1996) and, more recently, by Bernecker
(2010), whether true prompting is compatible with memory. There are two differences
here: first, incorporation is not the same phenomenon as prompting; second, the two
questions belong to different domains. The question about true prompting is whether
a suggestible agent who accepts a true prompt can be said to remember—whether
the receipt of the prompt violates the causal condition on remembering. The question
about helpful incorporation, in constrast, is about whether a memory belief resulting
from helpful incorporation can qualify as knowledge—whether the belief can meet
the conditions for knowledge. Note, first, that the relevant mechanism is different
in the two cases. As explained in Sect. 1.4, incorporation refers to the incorpora-
tion of testimonial information into an agent’s stored memory representation of an
event. Prompting, in contrast, refers to the impact of testimony received at the time of
retrieval. Thus we cannot assume that an argument about one case will generalize to the
other. Note, second, that while the question discussed under the heading of prompting
is metaphysical, the question about incorporation discussed here is epistemological:
a belief resulting from incorporation might meet the conditions for knowledge with-
out meeting the causal condition on remembering; a belief resulting from prompting
might meet the causal condition on remembering without meeting the conditions for
knowledge. One could pose an epistemological question about prompting, and one
could pose a metaphysical question about incorporation, but I deal with neither of
those questions here (though I do briefly discuss the implications of incorporation for
the causal theory of memory in Sect. 4.4).
1 The misinformation effect
I begin by setting out my basic conception of episodic memory beliefs and the con-
structive process that produces them.
1 In a recent article, Shanton discusses a related question (Shanton 2011); I respond to her arguments in
Sect. 4 below.
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1.1 Episodic memory
There are various ways of drawing the episodic/semantic distinction, but I will assume
here that episodic memories are those stored by the episodic system, and similarly for
semantic memories; the episodic system, in turn, is devoted to representations of
the agent’s experience, while the semantic system is devoted to other information
(Michaelian 2011a).2 But note that, while the episodic system stores representations
of the agent’s experience, it does not store only experiential information (informa-
tion deriving wholly from experience): experiential information can be transformed
or combined with information deriving from other sources during encoding or consoli-
dation before achieving stable long-term storage; moreover, during the reconsolidation
process following retrieval, stored information can be modified under the impact of
incoming information from various sources.
There are also various ways of defining memory belief, but I will assume that an
(occurrent) memory belief is a belief formed by endorsing information produced by
retrieval from memory; an episodic memory belief, in turn, is a belief formed by
endorsing information produced by retrieval from episodic memory. Note that this
characterization of memory belief assumes that memory stores representations or
contents rather than beliefs.3 While epistemologists sometimes write as if memory
stores (dispositional) beliefs, this involves a mistake. Memory does not store only
representations that the agent has endorsed, and it does not store only representa-
tions that the agent would endorse upon retrieval (Michaelian 2011b). Nor is this an
imperfection of memory—to the extent that the function of memory can be reduced
to information storage, it is, roughly, the storage of relevant information, rather than
the storage of endorsed information (Michaelian 2011c).4 When an agent retrieves
a memory representation and forms a belief with that representation as its content,
a metacognitive decision process intervenes between retrieval and belief-formation,
even in cases where the agent believed the information when the memory was initially
encoded (Koriat and Helstrup 2007).5 In other words: memory does not store beliefs,
it literally produces them.
2 In order to distinguish true episodic memory from the mere “episodic-like” or what-where-when (WWW)
memory possessed by some animals (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007), a satisfactory definition will probably
have to take into account the role of autonoetic consciousness, the distinctive phenomenology of episodic
memory (Tulving 1983; Vandekerckhove and Panksepp 2009).
3 Vosgerau (2010) argues, more radically, that memory does not store even contents but rather templates
from which determinate contents can be constructed.
4 See, e.g., work on the role of relevance in determining forgetting (Anderson 1991) or recent work on
fitness-relevance on encoding (Nairne and Pandeirada 2008).
5 This decision process is in most cases more or less phenomenally invisible, since it is not typically accom-
plished by a reflective, deliberate decision by the agent: retrieved information is typically endorsed/rejected
as a result of system 1 rather than system 2 processing (Frankish 2010) (e.g., automatic source monitoring
processes Johnson 1997; Mitchell and Johnson 2000), i.e., it is unreflective and automatic.
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1.2 (Re)construction in memory
The definition of memory belief in terms of endorsement of retrieved representations
will be inadequate if we assume a naïve picture of episodic retrieval as a process in
which a discrete stored record is retrieved unchanged; episodic retrieval is, rather, a
reconstructive process (Tulving 1982; Schacter and Addis 2007; Matthen 2010; Robin
2010; Michaelian 2011d). The memory system does not simply make available a stored
representation of an event. Before retrieval outputs a memory, inferences are made
to interpret stored information. Various items of stored information are combined;
these items stem not only from experience but also from other sources—non-expe-
riential information might earlier have been incorporated into episodic memory, or
activated semantic information might be incorporated at the time of retrieval. And
information available in the context of retrieval can also be incorporated. The recon-
structive character of the retrieval process means that retrieval typically produces a
representation that was never stored in memory or even previously entertained by
the agent—that retrieval, strictly speaking, is a matter of the production of a new
representation. For this reason, too, memory can be said literally to produce new
beliefs.
As noted above, memory is not only reconstructive but also constructive, that is,
the stored representations which are recombined in retrieval are themselves products
of a constructive encoding process. Indeed, information is not invulnerable to change
while stored: stable storage is preceded by a lengthy process of consolidation, dur-
ing which records are labile; and a similar process of reconsolidation, during which
records are again malleable, follows retrieval (Michaelian 2011d; Dudai 2004; Alberini
2005). Moreover, if connectionist models of memory are right, the distributed nature
of storage means that stored records are never invulnerable to change, as the addition
of new information inevitably alters stored information to some extent (McClelland
1995, 2011; Sutton 1998). Constructive encoding will play little role in my discussion
here: construction at encoding does give rise to an epistemological question analo-
gous to the question about reconstructive retrieval on which I focus (see Sect. 1.3), but,
though I suspect that the answers to these questions are roughly analogous, it would
require a separate argument to establish this. On some explanations of the misinfor-
mation effect, reconsolidation plays the main role; on the explanation that I favour
(see Sect. 1.4), the effect is to be understood largely in terms of reconstruction at
retrieval.
1.3 Incorporation of testimonial information
The problem with which this paper is concerned arises due not to the constructive
character of episodic memory in general but rather specifically to the incorporation,
through constructive processes, of information about an event received via testimony
after an agent’s experience of the event—the problem arises, in other words, due to the
sort of incorporation of non-experiential information into episodic memory respon-
sible for the misinformation effect studied by Loftus and other eyewitness memory
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researchers Loftus (1979/1996).6 Note that, while the misinformation effect occurs
when inaccurate information is incorporated, obviously either accurate or inaccurate
information can be incorporated into memory.7
While I focus on reconstructive retrieval, which allows the misinformation effect
to occur, constructive encoding appears to give rise to a problem analogous to that
discussed here, for it allows a reversed misinformation effect to occur (Lindsay and
Johnson 1989; Rantzen and Markham 1992; Holliday and Hayes 2002). While the mis-
information effect occurs when post-event information is incorporated into memory,
the reversed misinformation effect occurs when pre-event information is incorporated.
It is possible that the reversed misinformation effect can be explained in part in terms
of reconstructive retrieval: information received prior to the experience of the rele-
vant event is stored, does not affect the encoding of the experiential record, but then
is combined with the experiential information about the event at retrieval. But it is
likely that the reversed misinformation effect is to be explained at least in part in terms
of constructive encoding: information received prior to the experience of the event
affects the encoding of the experiential record itself. I suspect that my argument can
be extended to cover the reversed misinformation effect, but I will not attempt to show
this here.
The various available conceptions of testimony8 range from narrow to broad
(Fricker 1995; Gelfert 2009; Michaelian 2010); I will adopt an unusually broad con-
ception here. On my conception, testimony is a matter of any serious communication
by an agent, either by means of an assertion or by other means. E.g., the content might
be communicated not by means of an assertoric utterance but by means of a gesture
or by means of the presupposition of a question. Adopting this unusually broad con-
ception of testimony allows us to make contact smoothly with the eyewitness memory
literature, since researchers in that area are concerned not only with misinformation
that is explicitly asserted but also with misinformation that is conveyed by means of
presuppositions of questions, etc.
1.4 Harmful incorporation
I will refer to the incorporation of inaccurate post-event testimonial information as
“harmful incorporation”. In a case of harmful incorporation, the incorporation of
testimonial information results in the retrieval of an inaccurate memory and thus, if
the memory is endorsed, in the formation of a false memory belief; this gives rise to
the misinformation effect, “the impairment of memory for the past that arises after
exposure to misleading information” (Loftus 2005, p. 361).
6 I do not deal here with incorporation of information received from other external sources—my argument
depends on claims about deception in direct human communication and thus cannot straightforwardly be
extended to non-testimonial information.
7 There will also be cases in which some accurate and some inaccurate information is incorporated; for the
sake of simplicity, I set such cases aside here, considering only cases in which either accurate or inaccurate
information, but not both, is incorporated.
8 Note that I use the term here in the philosophical sense, rather than in a psychological or legal sense
(“eyewitness testimony”, “expert testimony”, etc.).
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In a typical experiment on the misinformation effect, the agent sees a complex event;
next, she receives inaccurate information about some aspect of the event; finally, she is
asked to remember the event; the misinformation effect occurs when the agent reports
having seen what the misinformation describes—a yield sign is replaced with a stop
sign, a screwdriver is replaced with a hammer, etc. (Loftus 2005).9 One plausible
account (see Ayers and Reder 1998 for alternative explanations) of the mechanism
responsible for harmful incorporation is provided by the source monitoring frame-
work (Lindsay 1994)10: roughly, traces originating both in the experience of an event
and in testimony about the event can coexist in memory; at retrieval, source monitoring
processes can misclassify these traces as originating in experience; this results in the
incorporation of testimonial information into memory and thus into the memory belief
formed if the memory is endorsed (which it normally will be, since it seems to origi-
nate in experience). Though I will assume that something like the source monitoring
explanation is right, the exact nature of the mechanism responsible for the misinfor-
mation effect does not matter for present purposes—it is consistent with my argument
that, due to reconsolidation, the receipt of the testimonial information results directly
in the modification or replacement of the stored experiential information.
Three additional points about incorporation. First: In order for incorporation of
inaccurate information to result in an impairment of memory, the agent must origi-
nally have had either an accurate representation of the relevant aspect of the event
or no representation of that aspect of the event. If incorporated inaccurate informa-
tion replaces another inaccurate representation of the relevant aspect of the event,
no impairment occurs—it makes no difference to the overall accuracy of memory.
Second: In at least some cases, the accuracy of the agent’s memory itself is impaired,
rather than only her verbal reports about what she remembers (Loftus 2005; Zaragoza
and Lane 1994). I will focus on cases in which memory itself is impaired, that is,
on cases in which harmful incorporation actually occurs. Third: In most cases, the
agent is unaware that she is incorporating testimonial information (Loftus 2005). The
misinformation effect can also occur when the agent deliberately chooses to accept
testimonial information. But such cases seem importantly different from the central
cases in which incorporation happens without awareness,11 and I therefore set them
aside here.
2 The contamination view
The overall epistemic status of beliefs produced by harmful incorporation is clear:
since they are false, they are straightforwardly not knowledgeable. The interesting
epistemological question to which the incorporation of testimonial information into
memory via reconstructive retrieval gives rise concerns rather beliefs produced by
9 As Loftus points out, while it is easier to modify peripheral details, whole memories for events that did
not occur can be implanted under certain conditions.
10 One virtue of the source monitoring explanation is that it has an easier time accounting for the reversed
misinformation effect than does Loftus’ overwriting account (Holliday and Hayes 2002).
11 In fact, they do not seem to be cases of memory belief at all; see the discussion of delayed formation of
testimonial belief in Sect. 2 below.
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what we can refer to as “helpful incorporation”, where helpful incorporation occurs
in the same way as harmful incorporation, except that accurate rather than inaccurate
information is incorporated, so that a true belief is formed if the resulting memory
is endorsed. The question on which I focus here concerns the epistemic status of
such beliefs: they are (I will argue) both true and, typically, justified, but are they
knowledgeable?
In this section, I set out and motivate the natural response to this question.
2.1 Incorporation as contamination
The cases of helpful incorporation on which I will focus satisfy the restrictions given
above for harmful incorporation: the testimonial information is really incorporated into
memory (rather than merely affecting the agent’s verbal reports), and this normally
happens without the agent’s awareness. Helpful incorporation can result in an improve-
ment to memory only given that the agent stores either an inaccurate representation
of the relevant aspect of the event or no representation of that aspect.
Helpful incorporation need be no more complicated or artificial than harmful incor-
poration: an agent can see a complex event but misperceive or fail to perceive an aspect
of it; later, she might receive accurate information about that aspect of the event; if this
post-event information is incorporated, retrieval will produce an accurate memory and
thus, if the memory is endorsed, a true memory belief. (E.g.: the agent misperceives
a stop sign as a yield sign but is later asked a question with the presupposition that
the sign was a stop sign; when she later recalls the event, she remembers a stop sign.)
Just as a reversed misinformation effect can occur due to the reception of inaccurate
pre-event information, an analogous effect can occur due to the reception of accurate
pre-event information; I have set the reversed misinformation effect aside, and I will
not discuss this sort of effect here.
I take the natural view on the epistemic status of beliefs resulting from incorpo-
ration of testimonial information to be what I will refer to as the “contamination
view”: the incorporation (without awareness) of testimonial information into a mem-
ory representation prevents the belief resulting from acceptance of the representation
from qualifying as knowledge. The contamination view covers both harmful incorpo-
ration and helpful incorporation. With respect to harmful incorporation, the view is
right but uninteresting: as noted above, beliefs resulting from harmful incorporation
fail to qualify as knowledge simply because they are false. It is less obvious whether
the contamination view is right with respect to helpful incorporation, but it is plausible
that it is—something seems to go wrong, epistemically speaking, in cases of helpful
incorporation.
I pause to point out that it is important not to confuse beliefs resulting from incor-
poration with testimonial beliefs, for the differences between testimonial beliefs and
memory beliefs resulting from incorporation means that one natural way of argu-
ing against the contamination view is ineffective. While agents clearly can acquire
knowledge by accepting information received via testimony, reductionists and anti-
reductionists differ over whether agents enjoy a default entitlement to accept such
information (Michaelian 2008); if we confuse beliefs resulting from incorporation
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with testimonial beliefs, it will appear that a standard anti-reductionist position in the
epistemology of testimony implies that, in virtue of this default entitlement, incorpo-
ration is straightforwardly compatible with knowledge.
According to anti-reductionism, agents enjoy a default entitlement to accept infor-
mation received via testimony. Consider, e.g., Burge’s “acceptance principle”: “A
person is entitled to accept as true something presented as true and that is intelligible
to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so” (Burge 1993, p. 467). Advocates
of such views might be tempted to argue against the contamination view as follows:
since the agent has a default entitlement to accept testimonial information, nothing
need go wrong, epistemically speaking, when she accepts such information without
being aware that she is doing so—she is simply exercising her entitlement; thus, as long
as the information at issue in a case of helpful incorporation is accurate, incorporation
can, contra the contamination view, give rise to knowledge.
In Sect. 1, I distinguished cases in which the agent consciously chooses to accept
remembered testimonial information rather than remembered experiential informa-
tion—this can occur because no relevant remembered experiential information is
accessible or because she takes herself to have reason to trust testimonial informa-
tion over accessible experiential information—from the cases of interest here, cases
in which incorporation happens without the agent’s awareness. Indeed, cases of the
former sort appear not to be cases in which what is ultimately produced is a memory
belief but, rather, cases in which memory plays an intermediary role in the delayed
formation of a testimonial belief. In a case of incorporation without awareness, a tes-
tifier S tells the agent that P; the content later retrieved from memory is P ; the agent
accepts the retrieved content, forming a (memory) belief that P . Contrast a case in
which the subject consciously chooses to accept remembered testimonial formation:
a testifier S tells the agent that P; the content later retrieved from memory is S said
that P ; the agent accepts the retrieved content, forming a memory belief that S said
that P; the agent then accepts the content of S’s testimony, forming the testimonial
belief that P . While, from an experimental point of view, it will often be difficult to
distinguish between cases of these two types, delayed formation of testimonial belief
is clearly psychologically distinct from incorporation of testimonial information into
memory without awareness; and this psychological difference grounds an epistemic
difference.
Burge remarks that “[t]he justification of the Acceptance Principle says that one is
entitled to accept intelligible contents “presented as true.” We must perceive a speech
act as involving a presentation-as-true in order to be justified under the principle”
(Burge 1993, p. 481); this means, I take it, that, in order to be entitled to accept tes-
timony, the agent must accept it because it is presented as true (though Burge makes
it clear that she need not consciously judge that it is being presented as true). This
condition is satisfied in ordinary cases of formation of testimonial belief, and it is
satisfied in cases of delayed formation of testimonial belief, but it is not satisfied in
cases of incorporation: the agent does not accept the testimonial content because it
is presented as true by the speaker—when she accepts the content, no trace of the
presentation-as-true by the speaker is accessed (and indeed, in many cases, no trace
of the presentation by the speaker will remain in memory at all).
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Nor can we argue that the endorsement of the testimonial content in an incorpora-
tion case is epistemically legitimate because the acceptance principle applies directly
to contents delivered by the agent’s own memory. The idea here would be that an
agent has a default entitlement to accept something that is presented to her as true,
regardless of whether the source is internal or external. The problem is that contents
retrieved from memory are not presented as true—as noted above, a decision about
the probable truth of a retrieved representation is always necessary, based on features
of the representation itself or of the retrieval process.
2.2 The justification condition
The contamination view is compatible with the justification of beliefs resulting from
incorporation—the claim is not that such beliefs must be unjustified. Nor is it plausi-
ble to attempt to account for the intuition that something goes wrong, epistemically
speaking, in cases of incorporation by claiming that the justification condition is not
met. Obviously, we should not say that beliefs resulting from incorporation are always
justified, as there will be cases in which the agent has defeaters for the relevant belief,
just as there are cases of incorporation-free memory beliefs in which the agent has
defeaters; I set these cases aside here, to focus on typical cases, in which the agent has
no reason to suspect her memory of misleading her.
One might suspect that, in cases of belief resulting from incorporation, the agent
does have defeaters: suppose that S remembers that there was a stop sign at the scene
of the accident and accepts this representation, forming the belief that there was a
stop sign at the scene; and suppose that her memory that there was a stop sign at the
scene resulted from incorporation; then it might seem that there is a true proposition
such that, if S were to believe it, her justification for believing that there was a stop
sign at the scene would be undermined, namely, that her memory that there was a stop
sign at the scene resulted from incorporation. But if my argument below is right, this
proposition does not in fact defeat S’s justification: if the argument is right, there is
nothing wrong, epistemically speaking, with forming a memory belief by endorsing
a representation resulting from incorporation. I will therefore take it that, in a typical
incorporation case, the agent’s justification is not defeated. Note, moreover, that, if
the specific proposition that the relevant memory results from incorporation were to
defeat the justification for a belief resulting from incorporation, so, presumably, would
the more general proposition that the memory results from a constructive process; and
since all episodic memories result from constructive processes, we should not take the
latter proposition to defeat justification if we want to allow that there are any justified
episodic memory beliefs.
Both externalists and internalists will agree that ordinary episodic memory beliefs
are justified, though they will tell different stories about the nature of the justifica-
tion for such belief. On either story, however, if we grant that there is justification in
non-incorporation cases, we should also grant that there is justification in incorpo-
ration cases. (It is impossible to discuss even the main varieties of externalism and
internalism here; I can only discuss representative theories.)
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Externalism: According to reliabilism, the degree of justification of a belief is deter-
mined by the level of reliability of the process that produced it. Since incorporation
is a routine part of the constructive retrieval process, we should classify the belief-
producing process at work in incorporation cases as being the same as that at work
in non-incorporation cases, that is, incorporation should be viewed an optional step
in the ordinary process responsible for the production of episodic memory beliefs. It
might be objected that we should distinguish between the ordinary retrieval process
and the process at work in incorporation cases—that the former is reliable does not
mean that the latter is also reliable. But this is an arbitrary distinction, for retrieval
is always reconstructive (see Sect. 3), and reconstructive retrieval regularly involves
incorporation—there is no more reason to distinguish between ordinary retrieval and
retrieval with incorporation than there is to distinguish between ordinary retrieval and
retrieval with any other effect of construction. Unless we are prepared to deny that we
have any episodic memory knowledge, we must say that this reconstructive process is
sufficiently reliable to a confer a degree of justification sufficient for knowledge on the
beliefs that it produces. Given reliabilism, then, we should say that beliefs resulting
from helpful incorporation are typically justified.
Internalism: According to a bland sort of access internalism, the justificatory status
of a belief is determined by how things stand with respect to it from the agent’s point
of view—it is determined wholly by internally accessible factors. On such a theory,
if there is to be a difference, in terms of justificatory status, between beliefs result-
ing from incorporation and other episodic memory beliefs, there must be an internally
accessible difference between the bases for these beliefs. But as far as internally acces-
sible factors are concerned, incorporation cases are normally indistinguishable from
non-incorporation cases: the agent is not aware that she has incorporated testimonial
information; nor, in many cases, could she become aware that she has incorporated
testimonial information, for, from the agent’s point of view, the relevant testimonial
information will typically be indistinguishable from experiential information. Again,
unless we are prepared to deny that we ever have any episodic memory knowledge, we
must say that the beliefs produced in non-incorporation cases are justified; and since
nothing internally accessible distinguishes these beliefs from the beliefs produced in
incorporation cases, we must also say that the latter beliefs are justified.
One might grant that, if memory beliefs not resulting from incorporation are jus-
tified, then so are memory beliefs resulting from incorporation, but object that I have
failed to provide an account of memorial justification. However, given the structure
of my argument here, which is meant to be neutral among theories of justification,
I need not provide such an account. One counts memory beliefs as justified when
they satisfy the general conditions for justification set out in one’s preferred theory
of justification. Regardless of one’s preferred theory of justification, it should be the
default position that memory beliefs produced without incorporation normally count
as justified, since to assume otherwise is to assume, implausibly, that we have virtually
no memory knowledge. The reliabilist, then, should assume that memory beliefs are
typically produced by a reliable process; and similarly for partisans of other theories
of justification.
Still, one might grant that the default assumption should be that memory beliefs
produced without incorporation normally count as justified but object that I have not
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dealt with the explanatory task of showing that such beliefs typically meet the stan-
dards for justification. Given that any reasonable set of conditions for justification will
be such that most memory beliefs satisfy them (see Sect. 4.4), I need not show this
here. Nor is there space to deal with this explanatory question: the question must be
dealt with separately for each distinct theory of justification, and the answer to the
question for a given theory will often be complex. Elsewhere Michaelian (2011b), I
have dealt in detail with the version of the question that arises for a form of reliabilism,
arguing that metamemory processes play a crucial role in ensuring the reliability of
memory. Versions of the explanatory question for other forms of externalism, and for
the main forms of internalism, will presumable require similarly lengthy treatments,
so it is not feasible to deal with them here.
2.3 The truth condition
The contamination view is also compatible with the truth of the beliefs resulting from
helpful incorporation—the claim is not that such beliefs must be false. Nor is it plau-
sible to attempt to account for the intuition that something goes wrong in cases of
helpful incorporation by claiming that the truth condition is not met. Certain views of
episodic memory content do appear to imply that, when helpful incorporation occurs,
it will normally produce a false belief. But there is independent reason to reject these
views; and, even should one of them turn out to be right, the epistemological puzzle
posed by helpful incorporation will reappear in a different form.
Various theorists have proposed views according to which the content of an epi-
sodic memory belief refers to the experience of the agent in which the remainder of
the content originates; Fernández (2006) (see also Fernández 2008a,b), e.g., defends
a view according to which the content of a memory that an agent S would express by
saying that she remembers that P is an ordered pair <having had a veridical perception
that P, S >, that is, e.g., something like I saw that P. If something like this view is
right, then my claim that the incorporation of accurate testimonial information into
memory will normally result in a true belief is in trouble: given a reflexive view of
episodic memory content, incorporation of accurate testimonial information will in
fact normally result in a false memory belief. Suppose that an agent either failed to
perceive the stop sign at the scene of an accident or misperceived it as a yield sign.
Suppose that she later incorporates the information that there was a stop sign at the
scene of the accident and accepts the resulting representation, thus forming a belief.
If the reflexive view is right, this belief will have the content I saw a stop sign at the
scene; this belief is false.12
There is, however, independent reason to reject the view. Episodic memories involve
visual perspective, and, crucially, the point of view from which the agent remembers
a scene is not always that from which she experienced it: while, in a field memory, the
12 The reflexive view permits that helpful incorporation gives rise to true beliefs in unusual cases. Suppose
that the agent saw the stop sign but encoded no memory for it or encoded a memory that was later lost.
Suppose that she later incorporates the information that there was a stop sign. The resulting belief, with the
content I saw a stop sign at the scene, is true. Such beliefs occur rarely enough that we can set them aside
here.
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agent remembers the scene from the point of view from which she originally experi-
enced it, in an observer memory, she remembers the scene from the point of view of
an external observer, so that she sees herself in the scene (Nigro and Neisser 1983;
Sutton 2010). While views on which the content of an episodic memory has the form
of I saw a stop sign at the scene rather than there was a stop sign at the scene are
natural given that we have only field memories in mind, they are much less plausi-
ble with respect to observer memories. (Obviously, we do not want the content of an
observer memory to come out having the form I saw myself standing next to a stop
sign!) Perhaps a reflexive view capable of accommodating observer memories can be
formulated, but I see no obvious way of doing so.13
Even if we grant that a version of the reflexive view is right, moreover, this simply
introduces an additional complication into my argument. Even if episodic memory
beliefs always have the form I saw a stop sign at the scene, so that beliefs resulting
from incorporation are normally false, this does not mean that the embedded content
there was a stop sign at the scene need be false or luckily true. In cases of helpful
incorporation, the embedded content will be true, and there is thus a question about
the epistemic status of this part of the belief; my argument in Sect. 4, if it succeeds,
shows that the accuracy of this part of the belief is not in general due to epistemic
luck.
2.4 The anti-luck condition
Even granted that memory beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation are true and
justified, the claim that they are not knowledgeable remains intuitively plausible—
there seems clearly to be something epistemically defective about such beliefs. I take
it that this is due to the fact that they appear to be only luckily true. Virtually all
epistemologists hold—and this accords well with our pretheoretic intuitions—that a
justified belief fails to qualify as knowledge if it is only luckily true. If beliefs result-
ing from helpful incorporation appear to be only luckily true, this will account for the
plausibility of the contamination view. Indeed, I will take the fact that beliefs resulting
from helpful incorporation appear to be luckily true to be the main source of support
for the contamination view; I will therefore take it that, if the appearance can be shown
to be false, we have no reason remaining to endorse the contamination view.
Note that the claim that the contamination view can be motivated by the appearance
that helpful incorporation involves epistemic luck does not presuppose the epistemic
theory of memory. According to the epistemic theory (Ryle 1949; Malcolm 1977),
memory is retained knowledge. One might argue on the basis of this theory that
helpful incorporation is incompatible with memory: helpful incorporation involves
epistemic luck; knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck; memory is retained
knowledge; so memory is incompatible with helpful incorporation. But the issue here
is whether helpful incorporation is compatible with knowledge, not whether it is com-
13 The reflexive theorist might argue that a field memory and an observer memory of the same scene can
have the same content—that they simply represent different ways of remembering the same experience of
the scene. But this move is implausible, given that a field memory and a related observer memory seem
clearly to have different (though overlapping) contents—they contain different information.
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patible with memory: on the contamination view, helpful incorporation, because it
involves epistemic luck, is incompatible with knowledge, whether or not it is com-
patible with memory. Depending on one’s theory of memory, one might accept my
argument against the contamination view while admitting that beliefs resulting from
helpful incorporation are not memory beliefs (that their contents are not memories):
e.g., as I point out below (Sect. 4.4), a proponent of a traditional version of the causal
theory of memory (Martin and Deutscher 1996) will have to deny that beliefs result-
ing from helpful incorporation are memory beliefs but can still accept that they are
knowledgeable.14
Note that, by the same token, we cannot decide for or against the contamination
view by charging that it draws its intuitive appeal from a naïve conception of memory
as non-constructive or non-inferential. While it is true that the conception of memory
as purely preservative which predominates in philosophy is empirically inadequate
(Michaelian 2011d), replacing the naïve conception with an empirically adequate
conception of memory as involving construction does not by itself rule out the con-
tamination view. The view concerns knowledge, rather than memory, and it might be
that, while memory is compatible with the constructive processes giving rise to helpful
incorporation, knowledge is not.
Before developing the suggestion that the appearance that helpful incorporation
involves epistemic luck accounts for the appeal of the contamination view, I deal with
a remaining dialectical difficulty. One might suspect that there is a simpler way of
accounting for the intuition that there is something defective, epistemically speaking,
about beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation than to suppose that it is driven by
the suspicion that such beliefs are lucky. In many contexts (including legal contexts) in
which we are prepared to rely on the memory of another agent, we are prepared to do
so on the condition that her memory is “really hers”—that is, that she really witnessed
what she claims to remember; if we learn that she is merely repeating what she has
been told by another agent, whether or not she is doing so unknowingly, we with-
draw or significantly decrease our trust in her report. Thus one might suspect that our
reluctance to evaluate beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation as knowledgeable
simply reflects the privileged status assigned in our ordinary practices to memories
stemming from the agent’s own experiences.
The problem with the suggestion that we can account for the intuitive plausibility of
the contamination view by appealing to our ordinary practices, a suggestion reflected
in the rhetoric of eyewitness memory researchers, is that the contamination view is
meant precisely to reflect these ordinary practices; pointing out that, in practice, we
are reluctant to trust memories resulting from incorporation thus does not explain the
appeal of the contamination view. The suggestion that the appeal of the view stems
from the normally unarticulated suspicion that beliefs resulting from helpful incorpo-
ration are lucky, in contrast, explains the appeal of the view; and it thus provides us
with a way of deciding whether the view is to be retained or rejected.
14 While construction, including incorporation, does pose problems for the causal theory of memory, there
is reason to prefer the causal theory over the epistemic theory of memory: in addition to the problems
pointed out by Bernecker (2007), there is the basic problem that a definition of memory in normative terms
fails to make contact with the descriptive conception of memory used in psychology.
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Beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation do indeed appear to be luckily true. In
a case of helpful incorporation, the testimonial information that the agent incorporates
happens to be accurate. But she does not incorporate that information because she
knows (or even believes) that it is accurate—indeed, she is not even aware that she
is incorporating the information. Due to this lack of awareness, if she were to have
received inaccurate information rather than the accurate information that she in fact
received, she would likely have incorporated that information instead—if she had not
received accurate testimony, she might easily have ended up with a false belief rather
than a true belief. It thus seems to be due to luck that she ends up with a true belief
rather than a false belief.
Indeed (though nothing in my argument turns on this), beliefs resulting from help-
ful incorporation appear to be Gettiered.15 Consider Russell’s example of the stopped
clock (Russell 1948): The agent looks at a clock. She knows that the clock is normally
reliable, has no reason to doubt its accuracy on this occasion, etc. The clock says that it
is 9:00; she accepts this information and so comes to believe that it is 9:00. The process
that she used was reliable, nothing is amiss in internalist terms—everything is in order,
epistemically speaking. Or nearly everything: the clock is in fact stopped, and it is not
9:00; due to bad epistemic luck, the agent has formed a false belief. Now modify the
case so that the agent happens to look at the clock at 9:00 (which changes nothing in
terms of her justification). In the modified case, good epistemic luck counteracts bad
epistemic luck, and she forms a true belief. But because the belief is true only due to
luck, it does not qualify as knowledge.16
Cases of helpful incorporation appear to have a similar structure: The agent retrieves
a representation from her episodic memory. She knows that her memory is normally
reliable, has no reason to doubt its accuracy on this occasion, etc. According to the
representation, there was a stop sign at the scene of the accident that she witnessed; she
accepts this information and so comes to believe that there was a stop sign at the scene.
The process that she used was reliable, nothing is amiss in internalist terms—every-
thing is in order, epistemically speaking. Or nearly everything: in fact, the retrieved
record is the result of incorporating false testimonial information (there was no stop
sign at the scene); due to bad epistemic luck, the agent has formed a false belief. Now
modify the case so that the there was a stop sign at the scene, i.e., so that the incorpo-
rated information is accurate (which changes nothing in terms of her justification). In
the modified case, good epistemic luck counteracts bad epistemic luck, and the agent
forms a true belief. But because the belief is true only due to luck, it does not qualify
as knowledge.
3 Sceptical implications of the contamination view
Having described and motivated the contamination view in Sect. 2, I will, in this
section, show that, despite its intuitive plausibility, the view has a highly implausible
15 I draw here on Zagzebski’s analysis of Gettier cases (Zagzebski 1994).
16 Note that reliability is compatible with epistemic luck: a belief might be formed by a process that is
reliable (in the sense that it tends to produce mostly true beliefs) but nevertheless be true only due to luck,
since, absent luck, the process would have produced a false belief on the occasion in question.
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sceptical consequence: it implies that we have far less episodic memory knowledge
than we ordinarily take ourselves to have, that we lack such knowledge in many cases
in which we would ordinarily take ourselves to have it.
Given that the contamination view implies the sceptical conclusion, we must either
accept the conclusion or reject the view. Though it is possible in principle to accept
the conclusion, this move should be viewed as a last resort: while it is not impossible
that the conclusion is true, its implausibility means that it is to be resisted; we should
be highly reluctant to accept it. It is therefore preferable to reject the contamination
view, despite its intuitive plausibility: the cost of rejecting the contamination view,
assuming that we have good grounds for doing so, is lower than that of accepting the
sceptical consequence. In Sect. 4, I show that we have independent reason to reject
the contamination view; thus, since doing so allows us to preserve a plausible position
on the extent of episodic memory knowledge, we should reject it.
3.1 Reconstruction and reliance on testimony
The contamination view does not imply the sceptical conclusion on its own but rather
in conjunction with two highly general empirical observations, one about the extent
of reconstruction in episodic memory, and one about the extent of our reliance on
testimony.
The first observation is simply that reconstruction in episodic memory is extremely
pervasive: retrieval from episodic memory does not merely occasionally involve recon-
struction; retrieval rather always involves reconstruction and thus routinely draws
on information from sources other than experience. Though I cannot offer a serious
defence of this claim here, I pause to offer an example (drawing on Sutton 2010) of
the sort of evidence that supports it; this evidence should suggest to epistemogists who
are used to conceiving of memory as essentially preservative that they are relying on
an inadequate conception of memory.
As noted in Sect. 2, an agent can remember a scene from either field or observer
perspective. It is tempting to think of field memories as privileged, even to think of
field memories alone as being genuine memories, for, in an obvious way, observer
memories fail to be true to the agent’s original experience: since observer memories
depict the agent herself, they are obvious reconstructions, departing significantly from
the agent’s original experience; it is natural to view field memories, on the other hand,
as being more or less well-preserved copies of the agent’s original experience. But this
temptation is to be resisted, for, while there is indeed a greater divergence between
the original experience and the retrieved memory in the case of observer memories,
this does not mean that field memories are any less the products of reconstruction.
That field memories are, like observer memories, products of reconstruction is dem-
onstrated by the ability of agents to switch between field and observer perspectives
within a single episode of remembering (Rice and Rubin 2009):
Field perspectives are in the same boat as those involving observer perspec-
tives with regard to the involvement of active, constructive processes, and can of
course also turn out to be false. Many or most personal memories are accessible
from either field or observer perspective, and …the perspective can often be
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switched: this suggests that the difference in perspective is one of form rather
than content, and that the same underlying (complex and distributed) represen-
tations can animate occurrent memories involving either perspective. (Sutton
2010)
The possibility of field/observer perspective switching demonstrates that stored infor-
mation does not determine perspective. The perspective of the memory is rather a
product of reconstructive retrieval: just as, in the case of an observer memory, the
system makes its best guess as to what the scene must have looked like from the rel-
evant observer perspective, in the case of a field memory, the system makes its best
guess as to what the scene must have looked like from the agent’s perspective as she
experienced it. The upshot is that even memories which appear merely to preserve the
original experience are themselves reconstructed.
The second empirical observation is mundane: agents constantly receive testimony
from other agents about an extremely wide range of topics, including events that they
themselves have experienced; and it is not rare that this testimony is accurate. I simply
note here that I see no plausible way of rejecting this observation.
The pervasiveness of construction, together with the frequency with which tes-
timony is received, suggests that incorporation cannot be rare: given that retrieval
normally involves drawing on whatever stored information is accessible in order to pro-
duce a best guess about the relevant event, and given that much testimonial information
is stored, the representations produced by retrieval will often incorporate testimonial
information—many perfectly ordinary cases of episodic remembering involve incor-
poration. Thus, if the contamination view is right, in many ordinary cases of episodic
remembering, cases in which we would ordinarily take ourselves to have knowledge,
we lack knowledge. Assuming, in particular, that received testimony is fairly often
accurate, in many ordinary cases of episodic remembering, we lack knowledge due to
helpful incorporation.
While this implication does not threaten all episodic memory knowledge, it does
reduce the extent of episodic memory knowledge significantly. Obviously, if our epi-
sodic memory beliefs turn out, due to harmful incorporation, to be false more often
than we ordinarily take them to be, we have no choice but to accept this reduction in
the extent of our knowledge. The interesting question here concerns cases of helpful
incorporation—here, there is room to manoeuvre, since the relevant beliefs are true.
3.2 Attempts to avoid the sceptical conclusion
One way of avoiding the sceptical conclusion is to modify the contamination view
so that it refers directly to the luckiness of beliefs resulting from incorporation rather
than to their knowledgeability, while adopting an unorthodox view on the compatibil-
ity of knowledge and epistemic luck: first, rather than saying that true beliefs resulting
from incorporation are epistemically defective in that they are not knowledgeable, say
that they are defective in that they are only luckily true; second, adopt something like
Hetherington’s unorthodox view that knowledge is compatible with epistemic luck
(Hetherington 1999).
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Making these two moves might allow the defender of the contamination view to
avoid the sceptical conclusion: she can maintain that, while beliefs resulting from
helpful incorporation are epistemically defective in that they are only luckily true,
such beliefs are, since they are justified, nevertheless knowledgeable and that thus the
contamination view does not threaten to significantly reduce the extent of our episodic
memory knowledge, despite the fact that helpful incorporation is frequent. The prob-
lem with this strategy is simply that, while Hetherington’s view on the compatibility
of knowledge and epistemic luck is coherent, it represents a radical departure from
the consensus among epistemologists, and it is highly counterintuitive; the strategy
should thus appeal only to those already convinced by Hetherington’s argument, and
I will not consider it further here.17
A more promising strategy is to reject the move from the observations that con-
struction is pervasive and that agents frequently receive accurate testimony to the
conclusion that helpful incorporation, in the relevant sense, occurs frequently. The
core idea here is that, while the two observations do indeed imply that incorporation
of accurate testimonial information cannot be rare, they do not imply that helpful
incorporation in the relevant sense is frequent: though the ready availability of accu-
rate testimonial information to reconstructive remembering means that incorporation
of accurate testimonial information into memory beliefs will often occur, this does not
yet show that it will occur without control by the agent; and ultimately it is control,
rather than awareness, that matters here. The idea is that while agents are normally
not aware that they are incorporating testimonial information, nonetheless the incor-
poration of accurate testimonial information is in most cases in an important sense
under the control of the agent, for agents are implicitly sensitive to the honesty and
competence of testifiers and thus are implicitly sensitive to the accuracy of received
testimonial information.18
If this strategy works, then the contamination need not imply the sceptical conclu-
sion: most cases of helpful incorporation will involve control, and the contamination
view can plausibly be modified to refer to incorporation without control rather than
incorporation without awareness. But the strategy is empirically untenable: agents are
not sensitive to the honesty/dishonesty of testifiers,19 and thus they are not sensitive to
the accuracy of received testimony. I have dealt with this question in detail elsewhere
(Michaelian 2011c); here, I simply review my argument. As the work of Park and
Levine and their colleagues (Levine et al. 1999, 2006; Park and Levine 2001; Vrij
2008), among others, shows, agents have no real ability to discriminate honest from
dishonest testimony (that is, they are sensitive neither to honesty nor to dishonesty).
It can appear that we are sensitive to honesty (though not dishonesty), since there is
a high probability that, given that an item of testimony is honest, the recipient will
judge that it is honest. But this is simply an effect of the “truth bias” which operates
17 The strategy also renders the contamination view significantly less interesting, since it requires that we
lower our standards for knowledge.
18 This strategy is suggested by Fricker’s position in the epistemology of testimony, according to which
agents are entitled to accept testimony because they monitor testifiers for signs of dishonesty and incom-
petence (Fricker 1995).
19 I discuss sensitivity to competence below (Sect. 4).
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in normal circumstances: we tend to judge that honest testimony is honest because we
tend to judge that any given item of testimony is honest, regardless of actual honesty. I
thus conclude that this strategy, too, does not allow the defender of the contamination
view to avoid the sceptical conclusion.
4 Against the contamination view: the information effect
Since I see no way for the defender of the contamination view to avoid the sceptical
conclusion, I will take it that the view implies the conclusion. In this final section of
the paper, I argue that, fortunately, we have independent reason to reject the contam-
ination view: once we adopt an adequate conception of epistemic luck, and once we
adopt an adequate approach to constructive memory, it becomes clear that we should
reject the view.
4.1 The modal conception of epistemic luck
While I have been discussing the status of beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation
as epistemically lucky, I have so far said nothing explicit about the nature of epistemic
luck—and hence nothing about how to determine whether a given belief is lucky or
not, beyond relying on our intuitions.
In motivating the contamination view, however, I relied on an implicit understand-
ing of luck in terms of control; as Pritchard (Pritchard and Smith 2004; Pritchard 2005)
points out, this is a natural conception of luck (defended, e.g., by Statman 1991). In
the epistemic case, this comes to something like the following: good (bad) epistemic
luck occurs when an agent forms a true (false) belief, the truth (falsity) of the belief
being beyond the agent’s control; that is, roughly, the agent does not see to it that she
forms a true belief.
While the control conception is natural, it is, as Pritchard argues, inadequate for
at least two reasons. First, many events that are beyond an agent’s control (e.g., the
sun rising Latus 2000) clearly are not lucky, so that the control conception of luck in
general is inadequate. Second, and more importantly, belief formation, in particular,
is typically not (and possibly never) under the agent’s control (McHugh 2011), so that
the control conception of epistemic luck is inadequate, as it implies, implausibly, that
virtually all true beliefs, and certainly all basic perceptual beliefs, are lucky. Since
we want a unified conception of luck (so that if the control conception is inadequate
with respect to perceptual beliefs, it is simply inadequate), this is not necessary for
my argument here, but note that an analogous point can be made with respect to mem-
ory beliefs: formation of many memory beliefs (though perhaps not those that result
from a deliberate decision by an agent to endorse the content of a retrieved memory
representation) is beyond the agent’s control, for much the same reason as formation
of basic perceptual beliefs is beyond the agent’s control—she finds herself seeming
to remember that P , and this is already enough to produce in her a belief that P , just
as seeming to see that P is sufficient to produce in her a belief that P .
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In place of the control conception, Pritchard proposes a more plausible modal con-
ception of luck20:
L1 If an outcome is lucky, then it is an outcome which occurs in the actual world but
which does not occur in most of the nearest possible worlds to the actual world
(worlds which most resemble the actual world).
L2 If an outcome is lucky, then it is significant to the agent concerned.
Pritchard points out that, given this conception, there are a number of varieties of epi-
stemic luck, many of them benign; the malignant variety with which we are concerned
here, a variety incompatible with knowledge, is veritic epistemic luck, the sort of luck
at work when “[i]t is a matter of luck that the agent’s belief is true” (Pritchard 2005,
p. 146):
L1-E If a belief is luckily true, then the agent forms it in the actual world but instead
forms a false belief in most nearby possible worlds.
L2-E If a belief is luckily true, then its truth is significant to the agent concerned.
I will assume that, at least in the case of memory belief, if an agent forms a belief, the
truth of the belief is almost always significant to her; thus I will be concerned only
with L1-E in what follows.
I will not review Pritchard’s argument for the modal conception of luck here, since
I have nothing to add to it; I will simply assume that the conception is roughly right. Of
course, a variety of different modal conditions on knowledge (safety, sensitivity, etc.)
have been proposed by different theorists (see Comesana 2007 for an overview), and it
might be worried that the focus on Pritchard’s particular anti-luck condition is unmo-
tivated or arbitrary, that the plausibility of the contamination view can be explained
in terms of the apparent violation by beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation of
some other modal condition, so that I should deal here with at least a representative
range of the available conditions. The worry is legitimate, but unfortunately, given
the subtle differences among the conditions, space simply does not permit exploring
the implications of a variety of conditions for the epistemic status of beliefs resulting
from helpful incorporation. I do, however, briefly discuss Sosa’s particular proposal
below (Sect. 4.4), and what I say there goes for modal conditions in general: as modal
conditions become increasingly demanding, they tend to imply that helpful incor-
poration is incompatible with knowledge, but this should count as evidence against
the more demanding modal conditions rather than as evidence against the thesis that
incorporation is compatible with knowledge.21
Though I will not argue for the modal conception here, I note that an important
virtue of the conception is that it explains the intuitive plausibility of the control con-
ception: “if one has control over a certain event, such that one is able to (typically)
20 I rely here on the version proposed by Pritchard and Smith (2004).
21 A general problem that affects all modal conditions on knowledge, including the condition that I employ
here, is that there seems to be no context-independent way of determining closeness of possible worlds; this
introduces an element of context-sensitivity to any claim that a given condition is or is not satisfied by a
given belief. As there is currently no real alternative to employing modal conditions to capture the anti-luck
dimension of knowledge, I bracket this problem here.
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determine that a certain outcome obtains, then that is naturally understood as implying
that in a wide class of relevant nearby possible worlds that outcome is realized and
therefore not lucky” (Pritchard 2005, p. 130). In other words, though control is not nec-
essary for the absence of luck, it is normally sufficient for it. This association between
absence of control and luck explains why it is intuitive to suppose that beliefs resulting
from helpful incorporation are luckily true (and hence not knowledgeable): in cases
of helpful incorporation, the agent does not see to it that she forms a true belief, since
the truth of the belief depends on the accuracy of the testimonial information that she
unknowingly incorporates, that is, the truth of the belief is beyond her control; given
the close association between absence of control and luck, this makes it natural to
suppose that her belief is veritically lucky. The association also helps us to understand
how the intuition that helpful incorporation involves epistemic luck could be mistaken:
because control, though sufficient for the absence of luck, is not necessary for it, the
truth of the agent’s belief might not be due to luck despite her lack of control over it.
If that a belief resulting from helpful incorporation is not luckily true, the explanation
for the absence of luck, since the agent lacks control, should be sought not in the agent
herself but rather in her environment or in the agent-environment interaction.
Given the modal conception of epistemic luck, a given belief resulting from helpful
incorporation will be luckily true only if the agent does not also form a true belief in
most relevant nearby possible worlds. I will assume that the relevant nearby possible
worlds are those in which the agent receives and incorporates testimony. (Obviously,
I will not assume that only worlds in which the agent receives accurate testimony are
relevant.) Thus whether the agent forms a true belief in most nearby worlds depends
on whether she receives true testimony in most of those worlds. This point is crucial:
given the modal conception, it is possible that, despite the agent’s lack of control over
the formation of a true belief in incorporation cases, beliefs resulting from helpful
incorporation are not luckily true; if it is not a matter of luck that the agent receives
true testimony (i.e., if she receives true testimony in most nearby worlds), then the
beliefs in question are not luckily true.
Recall the point made above that an absence of luck might be due not to features
of the agent but rather to features of her environment or of her interaction with her
environment. My suggestion is that, once we focus on the nature of the interaction
between agents and their environments, including other agents, in cases of incorpora-
tion, it becomes clear that beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation are not luckily
true.
4.2 Adaptive memory
This suggestion is guided by the general methodological assumption that we should
adopt an adaptive perspective on memory (as on cognition in general Anderson 1990),
including on the reconstructive character of retrieval. I will also assume that, in gen-
eral, true belief is adaptive (McKay and Dennett 2009). While folk psychology tends
to see memory as being extremely prone to failures and errors of various kinds, as a
deeply flawed system in need of constant surveillance and correction, on the adaptive
approach, memory (like other cognitive systems) is viewed as a system evolved to
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serve the needs of the organism of which it is a component. Given this approach, when
we encounter a feature of memory that initially appears to be a defect of the system,
we should, rather than immediately concluding that it really is a defect, first look to
see whether it functions adaptively. In particular, given that true belief is in general
adaptive, when we encounter a feature of memory that initially appears to be a defect
of the system, we should first look to see whether it serves the production of true
beliefs by the system.
When it comes to the constructive character of episodic memory, it is important to
note that, while it is often useful to study distortions resulting from construction, as
these can reveal the ordinarily hidden workings of memory (Roediger 1996), construc-
tion need not be a source of inaccuracy in memory (Michaelian 2011d). Consider the
case of boundary extension (Intraub et al. 1992): though boundary extension involves
the agent remembering more of a scene than she actually saw, it is consistent with the
accuracy of memory if the system’s “guesses” about the unseen portions of a scene
are accurate. Though this point is simple and should not be controversial, it is often
overlooked; it is likely a failure fully to acknowledge the point that has led researchers
to focus on the misinformation effect without considering the possibility that it is a
consequence of the adaptive functioning of memory.
An important insight into the adaptive function of the incorporation of testimonial
information into episodic memory is provided by research on deception and deception
detection. I noted in Sect. 3 that research on human deception detection shows that we
are truth-biased, that we tend to evaluate testimony as being honest, regardless of its
actual honesty. This truth bias (or something very like it) is already described by Reid
(in a passage that has often been cited in recent work on the epistemology of testimony).
According to Reid, this first bias “tallies” with another, complementary bias:
The wise and beneficent Author of nature, who intended that we should be social
creatures, and that we should receive the greatest and most important part of our
knowledge by the information of others, hath, for these purposes implanted in
our natures two principles that tally with each other … [We have] a propensity
to speak the truth, and to use the signs of language, so as to convey our real
sentiments. … [We have] a disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and
to believe what they tell us. (Reid 1764/1970, pp. 238–240)
In other words: the truth bias, in virtue of which we tend to evaluate most received
testimony as honest, does not operate in isolation; we also have an “honesty bias”, in
virtue of which we tend to give mostly honest testimony. Just as work on deception
detection has confirmed Reid’s suggestion that we are biased in favour of accepting
testimony, work on lying in everyday life is beginning to confirm his suggestion that
we do not lie easily (Michaelian 2010; DePaulo et al. 1996; Levine et al. 2010).22,23
22 There is also brain-imaging work that seems to confirm Reid’s suggestion. Summarizing this work,
Verschuere et al. (2010) argue that it suggests that “truth constitutes the default response of the brain, and
… lying involves intentional suppression of the predominant truth response”.
23 Sperber (2001) and Sperber et al. (2010), appears to argue on evolutionary grounds against the exis-
tence of these biases: dishonesty is often advantageous to testifiers, and thus testimony must be effectively
monitored for deception by recipients in order for communication to have evolved. But if the strategy of dis-
honesty results in sufficiently infrequent dishonest testimony, we cannot infer that the default strategy must
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Granted the existence of the honesty bias, there emerges a straightforward view of
the incorporation of testimonial information by reconstructive retrieval processes as
adaptive: given the operation of the honesty bias, most (though not all—obviously,
the bias can be overridden by other factors) of the testimony received by an agent will
be true; and if most of the testimony received by an agent is true, then, just as the
blind acceptance of testimony is a reliable process for the formation of testimonial
beliefs (Michaelian 2011c), the unknowing incorporation of testimonial information
into episodic memory is a reliable process for the formation of memory beliefs.
Note that this assumes that agents are largely competent about the topics about
which they testify, or at least that we have some capacity to filter out incompetent
testimony (since honest but incompetent testimony will normally be false). There is
room to contest this assumption, clearly, and I cannot hope to offer a full defence of
it here. I am optimistic, however, that it can be defended successfully, for it seems to
be supported by three considerations. First, general adaptive considerations suggest
that our belief-forming processes should be largely reliable—Quine’s point that “crea-
tures inveterately wrong in their inductive tendencies have a pathetic but praiseworthy
tendency to die off” applies to belief-forming processes in general. Second, there is
evidence that we tend to allow testimony to influence our memories when we believe
that the relevant agents are likely to be more accurate than we are (Gabbert et al. 2007).
Finally, there is evidence (Mascaro and Sperber 2009) that we have some degree of
sensitivity to testifiers’ competence.
Given the operation of the honesty bias, moreover, it becomes apparent that beliefs
resulting from helpful incorporation are typically not lucky, despite the relevant agents’
lack of control. Given that a testifier is honesty-biased on a particular occasion of testi-
mony, she will also testify honestly in most nearby possible worlds on that occasion—it
is not a matter of luck that the testifier testifies honestly. Thus it will usually be the case
that, when an agent forms a true belief due to the incorporation of accurate testimonial
information, she also forms that true belief in most nearby possible worlds—it is not
a matter of luck that her belief is true, despite her lack of control. The harmonious
interaction between the agent’s tendency to incorporate testimonial information and
an environment populated by honesty-biased testifiers rules out luck in most cases.
To emphasize this point, I return to the example of the stopped clock (discussed
in Sect. 2). Given the modal conception of epistemic luck, the agent’s belief in the
stopped clock case that it is 9:00 is luckily true because in many nearby possible
worlds, the agent forms a false belief instead: if the clock stops at a slightly different
time, the agent ends up with a false belief—it is a matter of luck that the clock tells
the correct time, so it is a matter of luck that the agent forms a true belief. Typical
cases of helpful incorporation are not like this: the testifier tries to tell the truth, and,
since she is competent, usually succeeds—it is not a matter of luck that the testifier
tells the truth, so it is not a matter of luck that the agent forms a true belief. Typical
cases of helpful incorporation are, rather, like cases in which an agent forms a true
belief by relying on a properly functioning clock: just as it is not normally a matter
Footnote 23 continued
be one of vigilance towards deception; and, for general reasons, communication must be predominantly
honest in order for it to have evolved (Michaelian 2008; Searcy and Nowicki 2005).
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of luck that the agent relies on a properly functioning clock when forming a belief
about the time, it is not normally a matter of luck that the agent’s memory incorporates
testimonial information when forming a belief about a witnessed event; and just as it
is not a matter of luck that a properly functioning clock tells the right time, it is not a
matter of luck that an honesty-biased testifier provides accurate testimony.
If beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation are not usually epistemically lucky,
the source of the appeal of the contamination view is undermined; I conclude that the
view should be rejected.
4.3 The information effect
Once we adopt an adaptive approach to constructive memory, including the incorpora-
tion of testimonial information, the existing focus in eyewitness memory research on
the misinformation effect begins to look inappropriate. If the argument given above
from the operation of the honesty bias succeeds, the misinformation effect should
occur relatively rarely in natural settings: the incorporation of testimonial information
will typically improve memory for the past, rather than impairing it.24
This suggests that the misinformation effect is better investigated in the context
of a broader “information effect”, where this refers to the effect on memory of the
incorporation of testimonial information, whether accurate or inaccurate. A positive
information effect occurs when the incorporation of accurate testimonial information
results in the production of a true memory belief that the agent otherwise would not
have had, either because she would instead have formed a false belief or because she
would instead have formed no belief. If accurate testimonial information is incorpo-
rated but the agent already would have formed a true belief, no effect (in terms of
overall accuracy) occurs. A negative information effect occurs when the incorporation
of inaccurate testimonial information results in the production of a false memory belief
that the agent otherwise would not have had, either because she would instead have
formed a true belief or because she would instead have formed no belief. If inaccurate
testimonial information is incorporated but the agent already would have formed a
false belief, no effect in terms of overall accuracy occurs.
Whether the information effect is, on the whole, epistemically beneficial depends
on the relative frequency with which the positive and negative effects occur. As Fig. 1
illustrates, if the negative information effect usually occurs, then the incorporation of
testimony diminishes the reliability, or both the reliability and the power, of memory;
if, on the other hand, the positive information effect usually occurs, as is suggested by
my argument in this section, then the incorporation of testimony improves both the
reliability and the power of memory.25
24 There is no guarantee of this, however, since incorporation will be adaptive even if the misinformation
effect occurs more frequently, as long as the payoff for helpful incorporation is sufficiently high when it
does occur.
25 I use “reliability” and “power” here in the epistemologists’ sense: the reliability of a belief-producing
process refers to the ratio of true beliefs produced by the process to total beliefs produced by it, whereas
power refers to the ratio of true beliefs to total beliefs plus failures to form a belief.
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Fig. 1 The positive and negative information effects. Psychologists have so far studied mainly the negative
information effect (the misinformation effect)
4.4 Objections
I conclude by considering two potential difficulties.
First, it might be objected that the claim that helpful incorporation can result in
memory knowledge is incompatible with the causal theory of memory (Martin and
Deutscher 1996)—I take the causal theory to be our best theory of memory—on
which remembering requires a continuous causal connection (via a memory trace)
between the original experience and the putative memory. Elsewhere, I have proposed
a modified version of the causal theory, designed to take the constructive character of
remembering into account (Michaelian 2011d). But even the modified causal theory
requires a continuous causal connection, though it does permit the addition of new
content through constructive processes, whereas in at least some cases of helpful incor-
poration, the relevant causal connection is absent (e.g., where the agent simply did
not experience the relevant aspect of the original event); thus the claim that helpful
incorporation can give rise to memory knowledge appears to be incompatible even
with the causal theory of constructive memory.
There are two points to be made in response to this objection. First: My focus here
has been on whether beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation are knowledge, not
on whether they are memory knowledge. Thus I can in principle grant that, while
beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation meet the standards for knowledge, they
fail to qualify as genuine memory beliefs. Second: Another option is to modify the
theory of memory even further, so that it allows remembering without a continuous
causal connection via a memory trace. I will not try here to determine whether such a
theory can be developed without adopting an implausible epistemic theory of mem-
ory, but it would be worthwhile to explore the possibility: helpful incorporation is an
aspect of the ordinary functioning of normal episodic memory systems; there is thus
good reason to count beliefs resulting from helpful incorporation as genuine memory
beliefs.
Second, there is the apparently contradictory view defended in a recent article by
Shanton (2011). Drawing on the literature on constructive memory (including eyewit-
ness memory), Shanton argues that episodic memory beliefs fail to meet the standards
for knowledge given by Sosa’s virtue epistemology (Sosa 2007). According to Sosa’s
theory, a belief counts as knowledge if it is the product of an exercise of an epistemic
competence, where competence is a matter of both reliability in the process sense and
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security, where the security condition is satisfied on a given occasion if no false beliefs
is produced in a nearby possible world on that occasion. Shanton claims that, typi-
cally, neither condition is satisfied by episodic memory beliefs: formation of beliefs
by episodic retrieval is an unreliable process; and many episodic beliefs fail to sat-
isfy the security condition. Rather than concluding that we have no episodic memory
knowledge, she recommends rejecting the reliability and security conditions.
I have been assuming that episodic retrieval is a reliable belief-producing process,
and I need this claim if my argument is to work given externalism, so there is a
genuine tension between Shanton’s view and mine here. But note that Shanton does
not actually provide much reason for thinking that episodic retrieval is an unreliable
belief-producing process: her argument amounts to pointing out that, due to its con-
structive character, episodic memory is fallible in some surprising ways, and then
asking whether it strikes us as reliable. Our tendency to answer “no” this question is
largely a product of our reaction to the divergence between the reality of the nature of
memory, as revealed by scientific psychology, and our folk-psychological “filing cab-
inet” picture of memory (to use Shanton’s term).26 The argument depends on the sort
of prejudice described above, according to which construction can only be a source of
inaccuracy. Pointing out that, due to its constructive character, episodic retrieval some-
times produces inaccurate beliefs simply does not establish that episodic retrieval is an
unreliable process, any more, say, than giving examples of visual illusions establishes
that vision is an unreliable process. An imperfect process can be a reliable process, and
there are general theoretical reasons to take formation of beliefs by episodic retrieval
to be reliable. The assumption that episodic retrieval is reliable is therefore the safer
bet.
With respect to security, there is no real tension between my view and Shanton’s.
I have said nothing so far about security but have focussed on the absence of episte-
mic luck. Whereas security means no false belief in a nearby possible world, absence
of luck means no false beliefs in very many nearby possible worlds, a much less
demanding standard. If memory beliefs fail to satisfy the security requirement (and I
will not try to determine here whether they indeed do), I suggest, with Shanton, that
the requirement should be abandoned. But while Shanton’s argument, if successful,
shows that many episodic memory beliefs, including beliefs resulting from helpful
incorporation, fail to satisfy the security requirement, it does not show that they fail to
satisfy the anti-luck condition. I have argued here that beliefs resulting from helpful
incorporation do typically satisfy the anti-luck condition, and I suspect that the same
goes for many of the other cases of construction discussed by Shanton.
Though I will not try to show this here, I appeal, again, to the view of constructive
memory as adaptive. Memory is fallible; due to its constructive character, in particular,
it is susceptible to various sorts of manipulation which can cause it to produce false
beliefs. But that, on many occasions, the memory system could have been manipulated
into producing a false belief does not mean that, on those occasions, it is a matter of
luck that it produces a true belief; given the structure of the agent’s environment, it
26 I noted above that folk psychology tends to view memory as error-prone; this tendency coexists uneasily
in folk psychology with the filing cabinet picture.
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might be the case that there is no luck involved. If memory is adaptive, we have reason
to think that it relates to its environment in precisely this way.
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